1. Not to be placed in the defense of error

Probably most today would agree with Galileo that in the natural sciences "one must take care not to place oneself in the defense of error" (Drake 1953:53-4). As you know, Galileo advocated observation and experiment in deciding what to believe about the natural world rather than a slavish adherence to the teachings of Aristotle. This lesson required a revolution in thinking. It was necessary, as Galileo said, "first to teach the reform of the human mind and to render it capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood, which," he added, "only God can do" (Drake 1953:57).

This revolution in thinking, led by Galileo and others, was instrumental in the flowering of the natural sciences. It has also been accepted, more or less, by the linguistic community, where careful attention is usually paid to the evidence of texts and informant responses. But linguistics has not flowered. Linguistic theory has been adrift for decades. As a discipline we do not know what to believe nor what body of theory to offer to our neighboring disciplines. We cannot even agree on what to teach our own students.It is a major scandal that in the era of modern science we still retain the ancient semiotic-grammatical foundations inherited from Aristotle and the Stoics. Although real-world objects are available to us for scientific study such as sound waves and the people who speak and understand, we still study nonmaterial objects such as languages, utterances, words, and meanings, which do not exist in the real physical world, and this has placed us inevitably in the defense of error. We find ourselves in this unhappy situation partly through the force of tradition but mainly through the lack of any proper scientific alternative.

For over 35 years I have been laboring to develop real-world foundations for linguistics that do not place us in the defense of error. They are now available in a new book (Yngve 1996) and can be recommended without reservation.

For your convenience I will briefly present 17 points of comparison between these new foundations and the old. They are summarized in the appendix, which provides references to the chapters and sections of the book where they are discussed. I don't believe any version of mainstream theory can challenge any one of these 17 points and no other version of grammatical or semiotic theory can challenge than a few. It seems to me that allowing even one or two of these points would be sufficient reason to consider adopting the new foundations.

2. How do we know what to believe?

Let us start with the illusion of language. The old foundations follow the tradition in assuming that utterances, words, sentences, and languages somehow exist in spite of the fact that at least since Saussure they have been recognized as illusory.1 Since the assumption of the reality of language and the objects of language is false, linguistics built on the old foundations leads us into the defense of error.2 It leads to the proliferation of additional false assumptions, as an examination of mainstream theory and other grammatical or semiotic theories will reveal.3

The new foundations, however, recognize up front that language and the objects of language are illusory; that the relevant existing reality consists, instead, of the people who speak and understand, the sound waves of speech and other forms of communicative energy flow, and the real-world surroundings that often affect communicative behavior. A linguistics built on the new foundations needs no additional assumptions beyond the minimum standard assumptions underlying all science: that there is a real world out there, that it is coherent so we can find out something about it, that we can reason from true premises to true conclusions, and that from observed effects we can infer real-world causes. This is point 1 in the appendix.

The new foundations, not resting on false assumptions of the existence of words etc., do not lead us into the defense of error by the unscientific method of the explication of intuitive concepts (point 2). We are not led to search for criteria for wordhood, for example, and test them against some unexamined intuition of what a word is. We are not led to rationalize our false preconceptions stemming from illusions by this essentially philosophical method.

It comes down to the question of how do we know what to believe. With the new foundations we can use the standard criteria of science validated during the 400-year-history of the advance of modern science: The standard criterion of acceptance of hypotheses when doubts arise is the ability of their predictions to pass tests against the real world by means of careful observation and experiment. The standard criterion of acceptance of observational and experimental results is their reproducibility when questioned. The old foundations, since they rest on false assumptions, do not admit these criteria.

3. Scientific laws and a scientifically justified notation

The new foundations allow us to formulate three underlying empirically established general laws of communicative behavior (point 3). The law of componential partitioning justifies our treating people and groups linguistically as systems described in terms of properties. The law of small changes and the law of restricted causation characterize the general structure of these systems and justify setting up scientifically testable specific dynamic causal laws of communicative behavior (point 4).

traditional foundations do no admit any scientifically testable laws of any sort. Specifically, rules of grammar do not have the status of scientific laws in spite of false allegations to the contrary. In fact, no other foundations for linguistics have ever been scientifically justified. Anyone who thinks otherwise is invited to show how.

The scientifically testable specific dynamic causal laws available with the new foundations make possible a scientifically justified notation (point 5). This is the only linguistic notation that is scientifically justified. All other grammatical, semiotic, or cognitive foundations, if they feature a notation at all, introduce it ad hoc based on the special assumptions of that brand of linguistics. Such notations often become symbols or trademarks for that brand of linguistics and for its leader. Since the notation cannot be scientifically justified, nonscientific appeals are used, appeals such as allegiance to a tradition, to a school, or to a personality, or perceptions of conventional wisdom or the latest vogue. On the new foundations, such appeals are unnecessary. No loyalty to any school of linguistics is asked, only loyalty to standard science and to our common cooperative endeavor of advancing our scientific knowledge.

4. Unified treatment of the context

The new foundations make possible a unified treatment of phenomena usually seen as syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic (point 6). This unified treatment is made possible by the built-in ability of the new foundations and the scientifically justified causal laws to handle the all-pervasive influence of the dynamically changing context, including what has been called the context of situation (point 7). This possibility is formalized in the new notation, which is computable so that proposed complex linguistic models can be tested against observed complex behaviors. The tradition usually treats context only in terms of the surrounding words and grammatical structures, usually limited to one sentence. Attempts are sometimes made to take the context of situation into account by the dodge of artificially textualizing it.

The new foundations, since they focus on people, individually and collectively, and what they are doing, also allow us to formalize the embedding of linguistic tasks in the nonlinguistic tasks they serve to coordinate. This is point 8. Traditional treatments usually ignore entirely nonlinguistic tasks and their coordination by linguistic tasks.

5. The implications of two orders of theory rather than one

Moving on to another issue, the tradition has vacillated between focusing on language as perfect only in a collectivity (e.g. Saussure 1916:30; 1959:13_14) or focusing on an ideal speaker-hearer who knows his language perfectly (e.g. Chomsky 1965:3). Is language social or individual? With only one theory, grammar, how can we do justice to both social phenomena and individual phenomena, which are different? The new foundations do not deal with language or with idealizations of perfection at all. These are nonscientific holdovers from ancient Greek philosophy and the normative tradition. The new foundations provide the needed two orders of theory, individual and social, for the two orders of observed phenomena, and there is a theory of the interrelation of the two. This is point 9.

Inherent in this is a scientifically justified treatment of the relevant physical environment, including the sound waves or other means of communicative energy flow. This is point 10. Also included, therefore, is an integral scientifically justified treatment of writing (point 11). Writing is typically ignored by modern grammatical theories.

The availability of systems that model individuals interacting in small groups of all sorts, together with a built-in means for treating the context of situation, makes possible a scientifically justified treatment of interactive and discourse phenomena. The treatment of context also makes possible a scientifically justified approach to literary and rhetorical phenomena, including metaphor. This is point 12.

The facilities provided by the new foundations also make possible the treatment of the linguistic development of the child in the context of the family and the community (point 13). The tradition would have it that it is language that develops, not the child.

And with the treatment of development we can also have a scientifically justified treatment of variation in the individual taking into account the social situational context in an integral way. There is also the possibility of the separate treatment of variation in the community, which reflects separate and in part different phenomena (point 14).

Stemming from the treatment of developmental and of variational phenomena comes a scientifically justified treatment of linguistic change in terms of changes in people. Linguistic change has at least since the neogrammarians been recognized as really changes in people, although the tradition continues stubbornly to treat it as changes in language (Osthoff and Brugman 1878:iii)(Lehmann 1967:198, 204). This is point 15.

With the successful treatment of all these phenomena, the new foundations provide an understanding of the actual source of the powerful illusion of the reality of language, words, sentences, meanings, and the like (point 16). So instead of assuming with the tradition that these illusory objects are real, a linguistics built on the new foundations is actually capable of explaining scientifically why these illusions develop and what their communicative function actually is.

Finally, point 17, there is an ability of linguistics built on the new foundations to interface easily with other sciences§social, psychological, and biological. This allows linguistics actually to fill its long-recognized natural place bridging between the social and the psychological sciences thus grounding the social sciences and connecting them ultimately to the lower-level physical sciences and completing the hierarchy of the sciences.

6. Should one accept the new foundations?

In discussing these 17 points of comparison, I have not compared the new foundations with any particular brands of linguistics. That should best be done by those who know them best. I understand there is a natural reluctance to question one's own pet theories lest they prove insupportable, but may I suggest that you take a deep breath and check out your own favorite theory against this list. I will be glad to help in this if I can. I have done everything possible during the last several decades to ensure the adequacy of the new foundations.

I also understand that it takes courage to challenge the widely revered semiotic-grammatical tradition, but perhaps not as much courage these days as Galileo displayed in challenging the widely revered authority of Aristotle. That required a revolution in thinking, the reform of the human mind to render it capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood. The result of that revolution was modern science.

So in considering whether to abandon the old foundations for the new, please remember that these new foundations are not mine; they are yours if you wish to help move linguistics into modern standard science. They are yours if you decide to accept only the standard assumptions of all science and the standard criteria of science in deciding what to believe about nature and if you wish to take care not to place yourself in the defense of error.

Appendix

The following is a checklist you may wish to consider in planning your own future research. It lists some of the points where resting one's research on previously available linguistic foundations leads one inevitably into the defense of error. In each of these points the new foundations would help avoid this and would also offer other significant advantages. I invite you to check out your own favorite theory against this list. The chapter and section numbers refer to places in the book where these points are discussed. If you need help, please let me know. I don't believe any version of mainstream theory can challenge any one of these points and no version of grammatical or semiotic theory can challenge more than a few. It seems to me that allowing even one or two of these points would be sufficient reason to consider adopting the new foundations. The new foundations offer:

(1) No assumptions beyond the minimum assumptions underlying all science (grammatical and semiotic theories all rest on various unjustified assumptions). See §1.7, §1.8, §1.9, §3.5, §3.6, §6.3, §6.7, and chapter 8.

(2) No reliance on the unscientific explication of intuitive concepts (grammatical and semiotic theories all rest directly or indirectly on philosophical methods of the explication of intuitive concepts). See chapter 6, especially §6.2 and §6.4.

(3) Three underlying empirically established general laws (no general laws available in grammatical or semiotic theories, in fact no scientific laws at all). Chapter 11, especially §11.2; and chapter 12,

especially §12.4 and §12.6.

(4) Scientifically testable specific dynamic causal laws (not available in grammatical or semiotic theories, where rules of grammar do not have the status of scientific laws). Chapter 12, especially §12.7.

(5) A scientifically justified computable notation applicable throughout general linguistics (not available in grammatical theories, where there are many notations to choose from but none is scientifically justified). §9.2, chapters 13, 19, and 20.

(6) A unified treatment of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic phenomena (not available in mainstream theory). Throughout the book, especially chapters 19, 20, 21, and 22.

(7) Formalization of the dynamically changing situational context (not available in grammatical theories, which can formalize context only through the static surrounding text, and generally only within the scope of a single sentence). Chapter 1, §7.2, §11.5, §11.6, §12.2, §12.7, §13.2, §13.4, chapters 19, 20, 21, and 22.

(8) Formalization of the embedding of communicative behavior in nonlinguistic tasks (not available in mainstream theory). Chapters 1, 7, §9.4, §14.5, §18.5, chapter 20, 21, and 22.

(9) Separate scientifically justified orders of theory at the individual and group levels and a theory of the interrelation of individuals, groups, and communities (not available in grammatical or semiotic theories, which have only one order of theory, grammar). Chapters 7, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18.

(10) An integral scientifically justified treatment of the relevant physical environment (not available in mainstream theory). Chapter 1, §7.2, §7.4, §9.4, §10.6, §15.2, chapter 16, §17.5, §17.6, §17.7, and chapter 22.

(11) An integral scientifically justified treatment of writing (not available in mainstream theory). §17.8.

(12) A scientifically justified approach to interactive, literary, rhetorical, and discourse phenomena (not available in mainstream theory). §7.3, §7.4, chapters 16, 17, 21, and 22.

(13) A formalizable and testable treatment of the linguistic development of the child in the context of the community (not available in mainstream theory). §7.7 and §21.8.

(14) Separate treatment of variation in the individual and in the community (not available in grammatical theories). §7.6.

(15) Historical change treated as changes in people (not available in mainstream theory). §7.8.

(16) Insight into the illusion of language (not available in mainstream theory). §1.7, §3.5, and §22.9.

(17) The ability of linguistics to interface productively with other sciences and to fill its natural place in the hierarchy of the sciences thus grounding the social sciences and connecting them ultimately to the lower-level physical sciences (not available in grammatical or semiotic theories). §7.1, §13.7, §13.8, §14.6, and §18.6.

Since these points are all closely interrelated, it would be most efficient to work carefully through the book as a textbook chapter by chapter paying close attention to the concepts and terminology, and then use the checklist for review.

Notes

1Saussure exclaimed in his notes published in the critical edition of his Cours that the illusion of things naturally given in languages is profound (Saussure 1967:24_6).

2Leonard Bloomfield, recognizing explicitly that a grammatical linguistics could not be scientific at its core, introduced his famous fundamental assumption of linguistics (Bloomfield 1933:78), which he admittedly knew to be false.

3For example, Noam Chomsky in his recent publications begins with a number of implicit and explicit assumptions for which he provides no scientific justification. In fact they cannot be scientifically

justified and are probably all false.

References

Bloomfield, Leonard, 1933. Language. New York: Holt. [Reprint. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1984.]

Chomsky: Noam. 1965. Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Drake, Stillman. 1953. tr. Galileo Galilei. Dialogue concerning the two chief world systems_Ptolemaic & Copernican. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Lehmann, Winfred P. 1967. A reader in nineteenth-century historical Indo-European linguistics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Osthoff, Hermann, and Karl Brugman. 1878. Morphologische Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiete der indogermanischen Sprachen. Pt. 1. Leipzig: S. Hirzel.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1916. Cours de linguistique générale publié par Charles Bally et Albert Sechehaye avec la collaboration de Albert Riedlinger. Lausanne: Payot. [citations from 5th edition. 1955.]

Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1959. Course in general linguistics, translated by Wade Baskin. New York: The Philosophical Library. [Reprint. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.]

Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1967. Cours de linguistique générale. Edition critique par Rudolf Engler. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

Yngve, Victor H. 1996. From Grammar to Science: New Foundations for General Linguistics. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

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